On Sat, 22 Jul 2006 03:09:07 -0400, email@example.com wrote:
> > >Virgil wrote: >> >> In article <firstname.lastname@example.org>, >> Lester Zick <DontBother@nowhere.net> wrote: >> > >> > On Fri, 21 Jul 2006 14:14:26 -0600, Virgil <email@example.com> wrote: >> > >In article <firstname.lastname@example.org>, >> > > > >[...] > >> > >Truth of "If P then Q" need not require assuming the truth of "P". >> > >> > Never said it did. I just said the truth of any Q demonstrated of P >> > requires the assumption of truth for P. >> >> But that only means that the truth of Q is conditional on the truth of >> P, and does not require that P be true, unless one claims that Q is >> unconditionally true. >> >> > Otherwise the truth of Q >> > remains problematic. It's an old and ongoing problem in Aristotelian >> > syllogistic inference: the truth of any conclusion is only supported >> > by the truth of the premises involved. >> >> Precisely. >> > >> > >If P and Q are compound statements such that Q is false whenever P is >> > >false, then "If P then Q" will be true regardless of the truth of P. >> > >> > Don't quite follow the logic here. The whole "If" conditional is an >> > assumption of truth on the face of it. >> >> It is an assumption of relative truth, but not of any absolute truth. > > >There is vast confusion in the use of the terms "relative truth", >"absolute truth", "conditional truth", "unconditional truth", >"trivially true", "vacuously true", "contingent truth", >"necessary truth", and other locutions. It's an embarrassment.
>I addressed the topic of the relation of truth to validity >in my postings to sci.logic on June 22, 23, and 24 of this year.
But I don't think resolution of the problem depends on inventing a new term to describe problematic truth.