On 24 Jul 2006 01:04:45 -0700, "R. Srinivasan" <email@example.com> wrote:
>Robert J. Kolker wrote: >> Aatu Koskensilta wrote: >> >> > >> > >> > That's a question, and non-sense at that; sentences aren't true or false >> > in theories. >> >> Not in the empirical sense. Sentences follow from the postulates >> (axioms) of a theory or they don't, assuming the sentence is well formed >> in the theory. > >A whole new logic (NAFL) has been worked out based on the idea of truth >with respect to axiomatic theories -- i.e., sentences of a theory are >true or false or neither *with respect to that theory* and there is no >need to postulate Platonic truth for the formal propositions of a >theory.
How does the evaluation of sentences in a theory in relation to the theory obviate the need to define truth in general abstract terms?