In article <email@example.com>, Lester Zick <DontBother@nowhere.net> wrote:
> On 24 Jul 2006 01:04:45 -0700, "R. Srinivasan" <firstname.lastname@example.org> > wrote: > >A whole new logic (NAFL) has been worked out based on the idea of truth > >with respect to axiomatic theories -- i.e., sentences of a theory are > >true or false or neither *with respect to that theory* and there is no > >need to postulate Platonic truth for the formal propositions of a > >theory. > > How does the evaluation of sentences in a theory in relation to the > theory obviate the need to define truth in general abstract terms?
Lets see Zick demonstrate a "need to define truth in general abstract terms".
The burden of proof is always on those who claim that a thing exists to demonstrate that existence.