On Tue, 25 Jul 2006 02:35:24 +0100, firstname.lastname@example.org wrote:
> > >Lester Zick wrote: >> >>email@example.com wrote: >> > >> >Lester Zick wrote: >> >> > >[...] > >> >> Aha! But unbeknownst to you the brain really works this way >> >> mechanically. It works through tautological regression and not through >> >> syllogistic inference as is commonly supposed. >> > >> > >> >Thank you for the explanation, both here and above. >> >> Well I'm confident you're being ironic. > > >I'm being polite. > > >> But the fact is that >> tautological mechanics are exactly what underlies the whole cerebral >> process we describe in syllogistic terms. In any even I won't belabor >> the point with those convinced otherwise. > > >[...] > > >> >> >> In other words >> >> >> if Q is true (and it is) it isn't because it's a component of P. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> >You're right, even though Q is a component of P. >> >> >> >> Where do you see Q in P? >> > >> > >> >Don't you see it? Your previous sentence ("In other words if Q is >> >true..." etc.) is ambiguous in that regard. >> >> Well the fact is that I don't see it. I see how it might be inferred >> given collateral judgments. But I just don't see the actual Q you >> describe anywhere literally in P. That's been the focus of my problem >> with your contention all along. > > >Well, the terms "component" and "literally" are not rigorously defined, >AFAIK, so it's possible we don't disagree. > >Take the two sentences > >1) Jones smokes. >2) Jones smokes. > >Obviously, (1) and (2) are distinct occurrences of the same sentence. >Are they "literally" the same? It could be argued that they differ, >at least in their placement on the page (or screen), and so are not >literally the same. > >If we say that they _are_ literally the same, then in that sense Q >("Margaret Thatcher is a politician") does not literally occur >in P ("Margaret Thatcher is a man, and all men are politicians"), >nor does it occur in (if I may) P' = "Margaret Thatcher is a >male politician". If we take "is a component of" to mean >"occurs literally in" (in this sense) then Q is not a component >of P. > >If, on the other hand, we take "is a component of" in a somewhat >looser sense, such as "is (logically) equivalent to a part (or >subformula) of" then it can be shown that Q is a component of >P and of P'. > >E.g., "Margaret Thatcher is a male politician" is clearly >equivalent, logically, to "Margaret Thatcher is a man, and >Margaret Thatcher is a politician." In this formulation, Q >("Margaret Thatcher is a politician") is clearly a component, >in this last sense, to a part of a sentence that is logically >equivalent to P'.
Okay I can see what you're getting at now. But my take on the problem would be that in your p "MT is a male politician" the predicate "male" designates a subset of the predicate "politician" and the predicate "MT" designates a subset of "male politician".And I think the question to be answered is exactly how the compounding of predicates is done in real mechanical terms and not just in terms of logical equivalence.
In other words the conjunction "and" does not just fall out of thin air. It designates separate disjoint operations which are compounded. And I think the order of predication designates "male politician" first and "MT" as a subset of that subset second such that nowhere is there any objective indication of "MT is a politician".
If you are to maintain otherwise I suspect we could find all sorts of potential logical equivalences which might be implied within any predication whether or not designated objectively.