> >> >> >> In other words > >> >> >> if Q is true (and it is) it isn't because it's a component of P. > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> >You're right, even though Q is a component of P. > >> >> > >> >> Where do you see Q in P? > >> > > >> > > >> >Don't you see it? Your previous sentence ("In other words if Q is > >> >true..." etc.) is ambiguous in that regard. > >> > >> Well the fact is that I don't see it. I see how it might be inferred > >> given collateral judgments. But I just don't see the actual Q you > >> describe anywhere literally in P. That's been the focus of my problem > >> with your contention all along. > > > > > >Well, the terms "component" and "literally" are not rigorously defined, > >AFAIK, so it's possible we don't disagree. > > > >Take the two sentences > > > >1) Jones smokes. > >2) Jones smokes. > > > >Obviously, (1) and (2) are distinct occurrences of the same sentence. > >Are they "literally" the same? It could be argued that they differ, > >at least in their placement on the page (or screen), and so are not > >literally the same. > > > >If we say that they _are_ literally the same, then in that sense Q > >("Margaret Thatcher is a politician") does not literally occur > >in P ("Margaret Thatcher is a man, and all men are politicians"), > >nor does it occur in (if I may) P' = "Margaret Thatcher is a > >male politician". If we take "is a component of" to mean > >"occurs literally in" (in this sense) then Q is not a component > >of P. > > > >If, on the other hand, we take "is a component of" in a somewhat > >looser sense, such as "is (logically) equivalent to a part (or > >subformula) of" then it can be shown that Q is a component of > >P and of P'. > > > >E.g., "Margaret Thatcher is a male politician" is clearly > >equivalent, logically, to "Margaret Thatcher is a man, and > >Margaret Thatcher is a politician." In this formulation, Q > >("Margaret Thatcher is a politician") is clearly a component, > >in this last sense, to a part of a sentence that is logically > >equivalent to P'. > > Okay I can see what you're getting at now. But my take on the problem > would be that in your p "MT is a male politician" the predicate "male" > designates a subset of the predicate "politician" and the predicate > "MT" designates a subset of "male politician".
I don't think so. The predicate "male politician" designates the intersection of the predicates (when taken extensionally) "male" and "politician" (and so is a subset of both). "Margaret Thatcher" is not a predicate, it is the subject term of the sentence. Also, the reference of the term "Margaret Thatcher" is, presumably, not a set, and hence, not a subset of anything. She is not an element of the set of male politicians, which p' falsely and explicitly asserts, and which p falsely and implicitly asserts.
> And I think the question > to be answered is exactly how the compounding of predicates is done in > real mechanical terms and not just in terms of logical equivalence. > > In other words the conjunction "and" does not just fall out of thin > air. It designates separate disjoint operations which are compounded.
Not following you at all, in either of these last two sentences.
> And I think the order of predication
I don't think there is an order of predication, or if there is, I don't think it matters in this context. In english it is more natural to say "male politician" than "politician male": I don't know why. But "MT is a politician, and MT is a man" is as natural as "MT is a man, and MT is a politician" and is equivalent in meaning.
> designates "male politician" > first and "MT" as a subset of that subset second such that nowhere is > there any objective indication of "MT is a politician".
If all swans are birds, then if there is a black swan, there is a black bird, no?
> If you are to maintain otherwise I suspect we could find all sorts of > potential logical equivalences which might be implied within any > predication whether or not designated objectively.
Again, not following you.
'Even the crows on the roofs caw about the nature of conditionals.'