> > "Margaret Thatcher" > >is not a predicate, it is the subject term of the sentence. > > Actually names are predicates as well just not obviously so.
The issue here is not whether a name may or may not serve as a predicate. The issue is that in this case the term "Margaret Thatcher" serves as the subject term of the sentences we are discussing in which it occurs. Every sentence has at least one subject, of which things are predicated. The subject term (or terms) need not be a proper name, or a proper noun.
> They're > what I call the lowest order predicate possible and the way I approach > this problem overall is to use what I call a universal subject such as > "it" to form predication like "it is MT a male politician" so we can > see the overall order of predication in uniform terms consistent with > other predications of other subjects.
Well, this might be interesting or useful in some context, although I don't (yet?) see its application here. My problem at the moment is that I don't see "It is Margaret Thatcher a male politician" as an english sentence. This could be fixed with a comma: "It is Margaret Thatcher, a male politician" or reworked with a connective such as "and": "It is Margaret Thatcher and it is a male politician". This last practically begs to be put into standard symbolic form: (Ex)((x=a) & Mx & Px) where "a" is a constant which stands for Margaret Thatcher. Or perhaps just (Ma & Pa)
> > Also, > >the reference of the term "Margaret Thatcher" is, presumably, not a set, > >and hence, not a subset of anything. She is not an element of the set > >of male politicians, which p' falsely and explicitly asserts, and > >which p falsely and implicitly asserts. > > Sure. That's why it's false. The real issue here is how this kind of > false predication can arise at all ...
What's hard to understand? "Margaret Thatcher is a man" is false, because Margaret Thatcher does not belong to the extension of the term "man".
> The real issue here is how this kind of > false predication can arise at all in mechanical terms through the > intersection of sets of predicates.
?????????? "Margaret Thatcher is a male politician" is false, because Margaret Thatcher does not belong to the extension of the term "male politician", which is the intersection of the extensions of the terms "male" and "politician". What's not to understand?
> >> And I think the question > >> to be answered is exactly how the compounding of predicates is done in > >> real mechanical terms and not just in terms of logical equivalence. > >> > >> In other words the conjunction "and" does not just fall out of thin > >> air. It designates separate disjoint operations which are compounded. > > > >Not following you at all, in either of these last two sentences. > > Well let me suggest this. In conventional terms "A and not A" is > considered to be self contradictory. At least this was Aristotle's > opinion and remains the same in modern logic. However there is a > mechanical difficulty with this interpretation. When we intersect and > conjoin different predicates conjunctively we do so through different > operations and at different times.So we can't really say "A and not A" > are necessarily true together at one and the same time and if they're > not necessarily true at one and the same time they aren't necessarily > self contradictory
Wrong. That is what contradictory means. A and B are contradictory if they cannot be true at the same time (and cannot be false at the same time -- without this second clause we're really talking about contrary statements. But "A" and "not-A" fulfill both clauses, and "A and not-A" is therefore always false.).
> since there is nothing to prevent "A" from changing > into "not A".
This is confused. The statement "A" does not change into statement "not-A". Let A = "It is raining now". Statement A may be true at time t_1 and false at time t_2, but at no time does statement A change into "It is not raining now".
Furthermore, it is not, IMO, the case that statement A is true at time t_1 and false at time t_2. The term "now" changes its reference at each occasion of its utterance, or of its apprehension, and therefore sentence A at time t_1 expresses a different proposition then it does at time t_2. It is an illusion to suppose it is the same proposition at two different times.
> On the other hand if I say "A not A" meaning "A is not A"
Confusion. What does "Jones smokes not Jones smokes" or "Jones smokes is not Jones smokes" mean? Or " 'Jones smokes' is not 'Jones smokes' " or " 'Jones smokes' is 'Jones does not smoke' "? These last two are at least grammatically correct but seem both false and irrelevant to what we're discussing.
> [then] I have one > predication which denotes self contradiction necessarily through the > use of one predicate "not" or "is not". In other words my point above > was that logical reduction in conventional conjunctive terms does not > necessarily denote mechanical reduction in tautological terms.
I'm clueless. Perhaps you are just being too telegraphic. Dumb it down to where even a idiot like me can understand what the hell you're talking about.
> >> And I think the order of predication > > > >I don't think there is an order of predication, or if there is, > >I don't think it matters in this context. In english it is more > >natural to say "male politician" than "politician male": I don't > >know why. But "MT is a politician, and MT is a man" is as > >natural as "MT is a man, and MT is a politician" and is equivalent > >in meaning. > > I don't necessarily disagree however see above. > > >> designates "male politician" > >> first and "MT" as a subset of that subset second such that nowhere is > >> there any objective indication of "MT is a politician". > > > >If all swans are birds, then if there is a black swan, there is > >a black bird, no? > > Yes this form of positive predication is legitimate. Where syllogistic > inference gets into difficulties is with negative predications.
What is negative predication? Is "Jones does not smoke" negative predication? How does syllogistic inference get into difficulty through negative predication?
> >> If you are to maintain otherwise I suspect we could find all sorts of > >> potential logical equivalences which might be implied within any > >> predication whether or not designated objectively. > > > >Again, not following you. > > Well let's say in your example "MT is a male" and "MT is a politician" > are both included of necessity in your predication.
My >>premise<< is "MT is a man and all men are politicians". My >>conclusion<< is "MT is a politician".
> What about the > conjunction "and"?Is it not a necessary part of your basic predication > as well? In other words given "MT is a male politician" are we not > looking at the mechanically conjoined predicates "male politician" of > necessity and if so how can we disjoin them mechanically just because > there can be other conceivable logical reductions of those predicates > in other contexts? Once you've reduced the intersection of subsets to > "MT is a male politician" you no longer have the sets themselves to > work with so you can't really say you have any other constituent > predicates to work with. In other words once you've predicated > something the original sets themselves are gone and mechanically all > we're left with is there intersection which is erroneous. > > The fact that we can compensate for this difficulty after the fact by > the use of conjunctive inferences doesn't alter the circumstance that > all we have after a tautological regression and intersection of sets > is the result and not the constituent sets to work with.
This is just getting worse and worse. I have no idea what you are talking about or why. Your "explanations" make less sense than what you are trying to explain.
You asserted, "If P is false then any Q demonstrated of P is false too."
I replied, "Let P = Margaret Thatcher is a man, and all men are politicians. Let Q = Margaret Thatcher is a politician.
P is false, and validly implies Q, which is true."
I think you're just trying to move heaven and earth to prove that you didn't misunderstand something.
If you actually have something to contribute here, and are are not just wasting my time to salve your ego, or for the pure fun of it, please address me in the future as a complete moron who has to have things explained to him step-by-step in words of one syllable.
Otherwise, don't bother.
'Even the crows on the roofs caw about the nature of conditionals.'