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Topic: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Replies: 135   Last Post: Jan 6, 2013 5:00 AM

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Watch Watch this User
Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Posted: Sep 10, 2009 11:20 PM
  Click to see the message monospaced in plain text Plain Text   Click to reply to this topic Reply

DO YOU NOT DARE TELL ME MY WORK IS NOT COMPLETE WHEN IT IS PERFECT WHO ARE YOU TO DEAL IN JUDGMENT/?

if (creation && object of art && algorithm && one's own algorithm) {
include * an algorist *
} elseif (!creation || !object of art || !algorithm || !one's own algorithm) {
exclude * not an algorist *
}



> On May 28, 4:


34 pm, Martin Michael Musatov
> <marty.musa...@gmail.com>
> wrote:

> > Math Forum Discussions  Discussions
> + sci.math.symbolic | Google Groups > The polynomials
> in y, P(n,y) := #i^n/n * B(n,
> +...mathforum.org/...thread.jspa Math Forum
> Discussions   ... sci.math.* » sci.math.
> Topic: P=NP Proof Published at CERN ...
> Martin Musatov a écrit
> :...http://mathforum.orgthrea.jspa more >

> >
> > An informal and highly experimental, unorthodox

> proof P=NP has been
> > published on CERN preprints.The Internet was
> invented at CERN.
> > Proof P=NP:
> >
> >

> http://cdsweb.cern.ch/record/1164206/files/s1-ln575821
> >
> 0-9223534-1939656818Hwf-1468147288IdV-1521282711575821
> 0PDF_HI0001.pdf

> >
> > It is mine, and it is not published anywhere

> else.My purpose in posting
> > it here is for feedback and suggestions on how to
> strengthen it.
>
> If it needs strengthening, it is not a proof.
>

> > I would specifically, as was my intention with this
> experiment,
> > like feedback from anyone interested in the
> methodology  used and
> > recognition of how I pursued and attained a broadly
> accepted
> > peer-reviewed published proof building on this
> basic result.
> >
> > Thank you,
> >
> > Martin Musatov
> > m e a m i[at]vzw[dot]blackberry[dot]net.

>
>


draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0 rfc5095.txt

Network Working Group J. Abley Network Working Group J. Abley
Internet-Draft Afilias Request for Comments: 5095 Afilias
Updates: 2460, 4294 P. Savola Updates: 2460, 4294 P. Savola
(if approved) CSC/FUNET Category: Standards Track CSC/FUNET
Intended status: Standards Track G. Neville-Neil G. Neville-Neil
Expires: December 28, 2007 Neville-Neil Consulting Neville-Neil Consulting
June 26, 2007 December 2007

Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6 Deprecation of Type 0 Routing Headers in IPv6
draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0-01

Status of this Memo Status of This Memo

By submitting this Internet-Draft, each author represents that any
applicable patent or other IPR claims of which he or she is aware
have been or will be disclosed, and any of which he or she becomes
aware will be disclosed, in accordance with Section 6 of BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. Note that
other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-
Drafts.

Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months
and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any
time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference
material or to cite them other than as "work in progress."

The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt.

The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at
http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html.

This Internet-Draft will expire on December 28, 2007.

Copyright Notice

Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

Abstract Abstract

The functionality provided by IPv6's Type 0 Routing Header can be The functionality provided by IPv6's Type 0 Routing Header can be
exploited in order to achieve traffic amplification over a remote exploited in order to achieve traffic amplification over a remote
path for the purposes of generating denial-of-service traffic. This path for the purposes of generating denial-of-service traffic. This
document updates the IPv6 specification to deprecate the use of IPv6 document updates the IPv6 specification to deprecate the use of IPv6
Type 0 Routing Headers, in light of this security concern. Type 0 Routing Headers, in light of this security concern.

Table of Contents Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2. Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
3. Deprecation of RH0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3. Deprecation of RH0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4. Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.1. Ingress Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.1. Ingress Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
4.2. Firewall Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 4.2. Firewall Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 5. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
7. Acknowlegements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 7. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 8.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 8.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix A. Change History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Intellectual Property and Copyright Statements . . . . . . . . . . 9

1. Introduction 1. Introduction

[RFC2460] defines an IPv6 extension header called "Routing Header", [RFC2460] defines an IPv6 extension header called "Routing Header",
identified by a Next Header value of 43 in the immediately preceding identified by a Next Header value of 43 in the immediately preceding
header. A particular Routing Header subtype denoted as "Type 0" is header. A particular Routing Header subtype denoted as "Type 0" is
also defined. Type 0 Routing Headers are referred to as "RH0" in also defined. Type 0 Routing Headers are referred to as "RH0" in
this document. this document.

A single RH0 may contain multiple intermediate node addresses, and A single RH0 may contain multiple intermediate node addresses, and
the same address may be included more than once in the same RH0. the same address may be included more than once in the same RH0.
This allows a packet to be constructed such that it will oscillate This allows a packet to be constructed such that it will oscillate
between two RH0-processing hosts or routers many times. This allows between two RH0-processing hosts or routers many times. This allows
a stream of packets from an attacker to be amplified along the path a stream of packets from an attacker to be amplified along the path
between two remote routers, which could be used to cause congestion between two remote routers, which could be used to cause congestion
along arbitrary remote paths and hence act as a denial-of-service along arbitrary remote paths and hence act as a denial-of-service
mechanism. 88-fold amplification has been demonstrated using this mechanism. An 88-fold amplification has been demonstrated using this
technique [CanSecWest07]. technique [CanSecWest07].

This attack is particularly serious in that it affects the entire This attack is particularly serious in that it affects the entire
path between the two exploited nodes, not only the nodes themselves path between the two exploited nodes, not only the nodes themselves
or their local networks. Analogous functionality may be found in the or their local networks. Analogous functionality may be found in the
IPv4 source route option, but the opportunities for abuse are greater IPv4 source route option, but the opportunities for abuse are greater
with RH0 due to the ability to specify many more intermediate node with RH0 due to the ability to specify many more intermediate node
addresses in each packet. addresses in each packet.

The severity of this threat is considered to be sufficient to warrant The severity of this threat is considered to be sufficient to warrant
deprecation of RH0 entirely. A side-effect is that this also deprecation of RH0 entirely. A side effect is that this also
eliminates benign RH0 use-cases; however, such applications may be eliminates benign RH0 use-cases; however, such applications may be
facilitated by future Routing Header specifications. facilitated by future Routing Header specifications.

Potential problems with RH0 were identified in 2001 Potential problems with RH0 were identified in 2001 [Security]. In
[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security]. In 2002 a proposal was made to 2002 a proposal was made to restrict Routing Header processing in
restrict Routing Header processing in hosts hosts [Hosts]. These efforts resulted in the modification of the
[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-hosts]. These efforts resulted in the Mobile IPv6 specification to use the type 2 Routing Header instead of
modification of the Mobile IPv6 specification to use the type 2 RH0 [RFC3775]. Vishwas Manral identified various risks associated
Routing Header instead of RH0 [RFC3775]. Vishwas Manral identified with RH0 in 2006 including the amplification attack; several of these
various risks associated with RH0 in 2006 including the amplification vulnerabilities (together with other issues) were later documented in
attack; several of these vulnerabilities (together with other issues) [RFC4942].
were later documented in [I-D.ietf-v6ops-security-overview].

A treatment of the operational security implications of RH0 was A treatment of the operational security implications of RH0 was
presented by Philippe Biondi and Arnaud Ebalard at the CanSecWest presented by Philippe Biondi and Arnaud Ebalard at the CanSecWest
conference in Vancouver, 2007 [CanSecWest07]. This presentation conference in Vancouver, 2007 [CanSecWest07]. This presentation
resulted in widespread publicity for the risks associated with RH0. resulted in widespread publicity for the risks associated with RH0.

This document updates [RFC2460] and [RFC4294]. This document updates [RFC2460] and [RFC4294].

2. Definitions 2. Definitions

RH0 in this document denotes the IPv6 Extension Header type 43 RH0 in this document denotes the IPv6 Extension Header type 43
("Routing Header") variant 0 ("Type 0 Routing Header"), as defined in ("Routing Header") variant 0 ("Type 0 Routing Header"), as defined in
[RFC2460]. [RFC2460].

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]. document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].

3. Deprecation of RH0 3. Deprecation of RH0

IPv6 nodes MUST NOT process RH0 in packets whose destination address An IPv6 node that receives a packet with a destination address
in the IPv6 header is an address assigned to them. Such packets MUST assigned to it and that contains an RH0 extension header MUST NOT
be processed according to the behaviour specified in Section 4.4 of execute the algorithm specified in the latter part of Section 4.4 of
[RFC2460] for a datagram which includes an unrecognised Routing Type [RFC2460] for RH0. Instead, such packets MUST be processed according
value, namely: to the behaviour specified in Section 4.4 of [RFC2460] for a datagram
that includes an unrecognised Routing Type value, namely:

If Segments Left is zero, the node must ignore the Routing header If Segments Left is zero, the node must ignore the Routing header
and proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type and proceed to process the next header in the packet, whose type
is identified by the Next Header field in the Routing header. is identified by the Next Header field in the Routing header.

If Segments Left is non-zero, the node must discard the packet and If Segments Left is non-zero, the node must discard the packet and
send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the packet's send an ICMP Parameter Problem, Code 0, message to the packet's
Source Address, pointing to the unrecognised Routing Type. Source Address, pointing to the unrecognized Routing Type.

IPv6 implementations are no longer required to implement RH0 in any IPv6 implementations are no longer required to implement RH0 in any
way. way.

4. Operations 4. Operations

4.1. Ingress Filtering 4.1. Ingress Filtering

It is to be expected that it will take some time before all IPv6 It is to be expected that it will take some time before all IPv6
nodes are updated to remove support for RH0. Some of the uses of RH0 nodes are updated to remove support for RH0. Some of the uses of RH0
described in [CanSecWest07] can be mitigated using ingress filtering, described in [CanSecWest07] can be mitigated using ingress filtering,
as recommended in [RFC2827] and [RFC3704]. as recommended in [RFC2827] and [RFC3704].

A site security policy intended to protect against attacks using RH0 A site security policy intended to protect against attacks using RH0
SHOULD include the implementation of ingress filtering at the site SHOULD include the implementation of ingress filtering at the site
border. border.

4.2. Firewall Policy 4.2. Firewall Policy

Blocking all IPv6 packets which carry Routing Headers (rather than Blocking all IPv6 packets that carry Routing Headers (rather than
specifically blocking type 0, and permitting other types) has very specifically blocking Type 0 and permitting other types) has very
serious implications for the future development of IPv6. If even a serious implications for the future development of IPv6. If even a
small percentage of deployed firewalls block other types of routing small percentage of deployed firewalls block other types of Routing
headers by default, it will become impossible in practice to extend Headers by default, it will become impossible in practice to extend
IPv6 routing headers. For example, Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] relies upon IPv6 Routing Headers. For example, Mobile IPv6 [RFC3775] relies upon
a type-2 RH; wide-scale, indescriminate blocking of Routing Headers a Type 2 Routing Header; wide-scale, indiscriminate blocking of
will make Mobile IPv6 undeployable. Routing Headers will make Mobile IPv6 undeployable.

Firewall policy intended to protect against packets containing RH0 Firewall policy intended to protect against packets containing RH0
MUST NOT simply filter all traffic with a routing header; it must be MUST NOT simply filter all traffic with a Routing Header; it must be
possible to disable forwarding of type 0 traffic without blocking possible to disable forwarding of Type 0 traffic without blocking
other types of routing headers. In addition, the default other types of Routing Headers. In addition, the default
configuration MUST permit forwarding of traffic using a RH other than configuration MUST permit forwarding of traffic using a Routing
0. Header other than 0.

5. Security Considerations 5. Security Considerations

The purpose of this document is to deprecate a feature of IPv6 which The purpose of this document is to deprecate a feature of IPv6 that
has been shown to have undesirable security implications. Specific has been shown to have undesirable security implications. Specific
examples of vulnerabilities which are facilitated by the availability examples of vulnerabilities that are facilitated by the availability
of RH0 can be found in [CanSecWest07]. In particular, RH0 provides a of RH0 can be found in [CanSecWest07]. In particular, RH0 provides a
mechanism for traffic amplification, which might be used as a denial- mechanism for traffic amplification, which might be used as a denial-
of-service attack. A description of this functionality can be found of-service attack. A description of this functionality can be found
in Section 1. in Section 1.

6. IANA Considerations 6. IANA Considerations

The IANA registry "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters" The IANA registry "Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Parameters"
should be updated to reflect that variant 0 of IPv6 header-type 43 should be updated to reflect that variant 0 of IPv6 header-type 43
("Routing Header") is deprecated. ("Routing Header") is deprecated.

7. Acknowlegements 7. Acknowledgements

This document benefits from the contributions of many IPV6 and V6OPS This document benefits from the contributions of many IPV6 and V6OPS
working group participants, including Jari Arkko, Arnaud Ebalard, Tim working group participants, including Jari Arkko, Arnaud Ebalard, Tim
Enos, Brian Haberman, Jun-ichiro itojun HAGINO, Bob Hinden, Thomas Enos, Brian Haberman, Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino, Bob Hinden, Thomas
Narten, JINMEI Tatuya, David Malone, Jeroen Massar, Dave Thaler and Narten, Jinmei Tatuya, David Malone, Jeroen Massar, Dave Thaler, and
Guillaume Valadon. Guillaume Valadon.

8. References 8. References

8.1. Normative References 8.1. Normative References

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997. Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

[RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 [RFC2460] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol,
(IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460, December 1998. Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", RFC 2460,
December 1998.

[RFC4294] Loughney, J., "IPv6 Node Requirements", RFC 4294, [RFC4294] Loughney, J., "IPv6 Node Requirements", RFC 4294,
April 2006. April 2006.

8.2. Informative References 8.2. Informative References

[CanSecWest07] [CanSecWest07] Biondi, P. and A. Ebalard, "IPv6 Routing Header
BIONDI, P. and A. EBALARD, "IPv6 Routing Header Security", Security", CanSecWest Security Conference 2007,
CanSecWest Security Conference 2007, April 2007. April 2007.

http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf

[I-D.ietf-v6ops-security-overview] [Hosts] Savola, P., "Note about Routing Header Processing on
Davies, E., "IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security IPv6 Hosts", Work in Progress, February 2002.
Considerations", draft-ietf-v6ops-security-overview-06
(work in progress), October 2006.

[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security]
Savola, P., "Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home
Address Options", draft-savola-ipv6-rh-ha-security-02
(work in progress), March 2002.

[I-D.savola-ipv6-rh-hosts]
Savola, P., "Note about Routing Header Processing on IPv6
Hosts", draft-savola-ipv6-rh-hosts-00 (work in progress),
February 2002.

[RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827, May 2000.

[RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.

[RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

Appendix A. Change History

This section to be removed prior to publication.

00 Strawman, draft-jabley-ipv6-rh0-is-evil, circulated to provoke
discussion.

01 Clarified Section 3; presented more options in Section 4; added
Pekka and George as authors. This document version was not widely
circulated.

00 Renamed, draft-ietf-ipv6-deprecate-rh0, a candidate working group [RFC2827] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress
document. Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which
employ IP Source Address Spoofing", BCP 38, RFC 2827,
May 2000.

01-candidate-00 Incorporated text summarising some of the unwelcome [RFC3704] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for
uses of RH0; added some clariying text describing deprecation; Multihomed Networks", BCP 84, RFC 3704, March 2004.
modified some ambiguous text in Section 4.2; added "Updates:
4294".

01-candidate-01 Incorporated contributions from working group: [RFC3775] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility
substantially reduced Section 5; clarified wording in Section 3. Support in IPv6", RFC 3775, June 2004.

01-candidate-02 Moved description of traffic amplification to [RFC4942] Davies, E., Krishnan, S., and P. Savola, "IPv6
Section 1, and inserted a corresponding cross-reference in Transition/Co-existence Security Considerations",
Section 5. Strengthened the language in Section 4.2 along the RFC 4942, September 2007.
lines suggested by Thomas Narten. Small typos corrected. Added a
further sentence in Section 4.1 intended to act as further
encouragement for operators to implement [RFC3704].

01 Minor wordsmithing; removed some subjective language; adopted [Security] Savola, P., "Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home
"intermediate node" nomenclature instead of "waypoint"; shifted Address Options", Work in Progress, March 2002.
some history from Section 7 to Section 1.

Authors' Addresses Authors' Addresses

Joe Abley Joe Abley
Afilias Canada Corp. Afilias Canada Corp.
Suite 204, 4141 Yonge Street Suite 204, 4141 Yonge Street
Toronto, ON M2P 2A8 Toronto, ON M2P 2A8
Canada Canada

Phone: +1 416 673 4176 Phone: +1 416 673 4176
Email: jabley@ca.afilias.info EMail: jabley@ca.afilias.info

Pekka Savola Pekka Savola
CSC/FUNET CSC/FUNET
Espoo, Espoo,
Finland Finland

Email: psavola@funet.fi EMail: psavola@funet.fi

George Neville-Neil George Neville-Neil
Neville-Neil Consulting Neville-Neil Consulting
2261 Market St. #239 2261 Market St. #239
San Francisco, CA 94114 San Francisco, CA 94114
USA USA

Email: gnn@neville-neil.com EMail: gnn@neville-neil.com

Full Copyright Statement Full Copyright Statement

Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).

This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors contained in BCP 78, and except as set forth therein, the authors
retain all their rights. retain all their rights.

This document and the information contained herein are provided on an This document and the information contained herein are provided on an

skipping to change at page 9, line 44 skipping to change at line 281
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
http://www.ietf.org/ipr. http://www.ietf.org/ipr.

The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
ietf-ipr@ietf.org. ietf-ipr@ietf.org.

Acknowledgment

Funding for the RFC Editor function is provided by the IETF
Administrative Support Activity (IASA).

End of changes. 31 change blocks.
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|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||\ \}}}}}}}}}}
||||||||||||||||||||||||||© 2009 Martin Musatov }}}}}}}}}}}}}}
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||AllRights Reserved.}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||http://MeAmI.org (tm)}}}}}}}}}}
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||}}}}}}}}}{/////////||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||mmmmm
}}}}}}}}}}http://MeAmI.org (tm) ||||||||||||| NP
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||}}}}}}}}}© 2009 Martin Musatov All Rights Reserved.
{P=NP}|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||NP+P|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||NP=P


Date Subject Author
5/9/09
Read P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/9/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Denis Feldmann
5/10/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
amy666
5/10/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/11/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/11/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
VMCM1905
5/11/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/11/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/12/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
mensanator
5/12/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
VMCM1905
5/13/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
mensanator
5/15/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/13/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/13/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
VMCM1905
5/15/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/15/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
VMCM1905
5/20/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/20/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
mensanator
5/20/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
A N Niel
5/15/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/15/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
VMCM1905
5/16/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/9/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
victor_meldrew_666@yahoo.co.uk
5/10/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/9/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
A N Niel
5/9/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/9/09
Read Re: P=NP Proof Published at CERN
Guest
5/10/09
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