In <5n6hgm$a9l@netnews.upenn.edu>, weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu (Matthew P Wiener) writes: >In article <5mvnna$hhj$1@news.fas.harvard.edu>, kubo@abel (Tal Kubo) writes: >>Matthew P Wiener <weemba@sagi.wistar.upenn.edu> wrote: > >>>>>>>The original theory can thus talk about the theory that >>>>>>>consists of the evolved probability 1 statements. >>>>>>>These are consistent and definable in the original TM-mind. > >>>>>Define them collectively as the probability 1 sentences in the omega limit. > >>>>Tarski's theorem says this is impossible. A theory can't define >>>>it's own true sentences in any particular model, > >>>Right! That's what I'm doing. > >>OK. So the starting theory can't define all the probability 1 statements. > >No, we get a contradiction, so something's wrong. > >>How does that prevent particular hard statements from evaluating to 1, >>but without the starting theory noticing? i.e., how is your alpha=omega >>punchline enforced by Tarski's theorem? > >The truth for the alpha theory is presumed enforced by evolution. The relative >truth of new omega statements is definable from the alpha theory. *That* would >be the Tarski punchline. > >>>> such as the one >>>>that a hypothetical 0-1 law would produce under some given evolution. >
Could it be that the ultimate TM-mind is something like the bomb 21(?) in the movie 'Dark Star' which goes something like : "There's nothing but me -- here comes the light' ?
