"Acme Prognostics" <LFine.ap@ZAPTHISgmail.com> skrev i melding news:email@example.com... > > "Tronscend" <firstname.lastname@example.org> wrote: >>"Acme Prognostics" <LFine.ap@ZAPTHISgmail.com> skrev i melding >>> "Tronscend" <email@example.com> wrote: >>>>"Acme Prognostics" <LFine.ap@ZAPTHISgmail.com> skrev i melding >> >>Hi there, > > Hey. > >>> Can't comment on 'proof' of syllogisms. I agree probability does >>> not explain why, etc., re: some next event as defined earlier. >> >>Unleashing my previous attempt to explain entailment by rewriting >>it as inclusion in concept spheres to produce a violation of the >>Law of Contradiction when denying to accept the conclusion as >>what the premises entail, I'd say that induction/probability >>cannot present a major premise that is a universal affirmative, >>but merely set of all instances that only approaches 100 %; with >>such a non-all-inclusive concept sphere, denying to accept the >>conclusion as what the premises entail does not automatically >>produce a violation of the Law of Contradiction. > > The problem def can specify a set of possible outcomes which is a > universal. The P number is a theory number and can be universal. > I think what you're saying is that single outcomes can't > contradict these, which is true. > > All flips are either heads or tails. > The P of heads is .5 > This flip is heads. > This flip is tails. > > Altogether, so far, I think we've differentiated between: 1) > problem definition, 2) P calculation, 3) single events, and 4) > P(rw) approaching P(t) in high N trials, and 5) transition to RW. > >>> arguments about Hume on usenet. So far, none are simple, >> >>It is a rather specialist discussion (amonst historians of >>philosophy. Yeah, well, OK, some of his arguments are still not >>refuted, e.g. Humes Guillotine). OTOH, a lot of britishers have >>read Hume and think he is the bee's knees, etc., and he has >>spawned a long tradition (Mill, etc.) that has firmly entrenched >>the "commonsense" strain into Anglo philosophy; which then gained >>world wide influence under Victoria Rx. It's like the switch >>point of railroads; trains sent off on a sidetrack 200 years ago >>will struggle to achieve certain destinations. > > Agree about the trains. The main problem, to me, is to derail the > trains that go where people "ought not" to go. The earlier in > the trip, the easier. By "ought not" I mean: If a movie theatre > showed a travelogue with sound, most patrons would be crying, > screaming in terror, throwing up, gnashing teeth, renting > clothes, etc. But there's always those few who love it. Getting > less few these days. > > Your route makes me wonder what would be an example of > a route and destination that is nice, but far from the The > Hume-British-Mill-Anglo-Victoria-commonsense route. > >>> "Reliability:" a probability to overcome the cost of being wrong. >> >>Hmmm... >>A) There is a cost of being wrong. >>2) This cost can be "overcome" (How? By A) incurring it, or by B) >>not incurring it?) 3) Reliability is the probability of 2A = .... >>that we are able to cover the cost...? I suspect not ... >>4) Reliability is the probability of 2B = that we are able to >>avoid the cost by not being wrong. Right? > > If the cost is very big, yes avoid in 1,000 lifetimes. Otherwise > no need to avoid. If we make 15% return on 9 out of 10 decisions, > then we have overcome the cost of being wrong. The probability of > killing a child X the cost of killing a child is less than the > probability of driving to/from the store safely X the benefit of > eating a candy bar. In US law, "ordinary and prudent." > > The cost of being wrong about the univ. law of gravitation is > very high, but the P is so low that the product is much less than > the P of being right X the cost of, e.g., astronaut's lives. > > In a practical sense, it would be foolish for ordinary folks to > argue about "settled science" such as gravitation. But it > wouldn't be so foolish for credentialed and *employed* scientific > researchers investigating it in the 9th dimension. > > But, just like with coin-flips, the above often doesn't hold when > considering single events. E.g., you wouldn't put all your > retirement eggs in one basket even though it calculates the > highest return. > >>> science" (peer review, etc.) But for it to work, the requirement >>> can't be so high as to cover trivial possibilities. Otherwise, >> >>What would be trivial possibilities in this scenario? >>Brains in vats, constant instant destruction and recreation of >>the Universe, universal scepticism etc.? > > Yes. But some spec-sci writers think that everything you can > imagine exists somewhere, and everything you can't. I subscribe > to that, not that that matters. It's unfalsifiable and makes me > feel good. > >>Or "why not investigate yet another Elvis sighting? Science doesn't know >>until it has >>examined every case"? > > No, that's a cost-benefit decision. The probability of finding > Elvis X the benefit of doing so is way less than the probability > of not finding him X the cost of investigating. Science doesn't > know anything for sure anyway. It just takes its best shot. > > Most decisions in science are cost-benefit. There are cute > exceptions: It makes no sense to send a starship to Alpha Centuri > now. The ship we build in 100 years would just pass it on the > way. So there's some overall organizing required too. > >>> a sweeping universal like "There is no justification for >>> induction" is easy to defend. I doubt that's what Hume said or > >>He (and others before him) merely said that induction does not >>have the same justification as deduction. > > I think any definitional philosopher would agree with that. Well, > I do. Thanks for clearing up this induction business about Hume. > >>It's like saying >>sailboats aren't moved by the same forces as those which propel a >>car. Both are still means of transport; just don't fill your boat >>with gasoline. > > That's equally agreeable. > >>> In a probability class (theory) the P of heads in a coin-flip is >>> 5. In a coin-testing lab it's .5002183 (or whatever). To an >>> all-knowing god it's either 1 or 0. To someone with a two-headed >>> coin, it's 1. >> >>So, what part of "random" changes with our knowing conditions? >>IOW, do we diff. between something wich is truly random, >>and that wich apperas random out of our ignorance? > > Dorayme answered that! <g> True random v. pseudo random. It's his > one piece of information in the thread! (Besides "entailment" for > everyone who didn't know about that. <g>) > > One is both the same in our POV. We treat them the same except > when discussing Hume, which practitioners don't do very often. > >>(Ontological randomness vs. epistemological randomness?) > > Things that exist being random v. our knowledge of things > that exist being random? If so, seems the same distinction to me. > >>Is a random event still random if we can describe it in detail >>and predict the outcome? > > No. Any ability to predict is non-random by definition. (within > a defined range, within a set of possible results). > > Randomness also depends on the problem definition. Suppose > you have a six-sided die with two 6's and no 4. It is random > if the problem says two 6's and no 4. If the prob def says it's > a fair die with sides 1-6, but it actually has two 6's and no 4, > then it's non-random. > >>Isn't random = "not influenced by the past"? > > I don't think so. There could be a perfect random number > generator on Antares 23, and they could know how it works but it > still produces random numbers. > >>Or am I confusing randomness with indeterminacy? > > I think you are better qualifed to answer that. As far as I know, > randomness is "unpredictable next events among a set of > possible events" whereas determinacy is "not one thing in the > universe escapes certainty." > >>>>I was otherwise referring to the holy grail of Olde Science, >>>>namely apodeixis ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apodicticity ). >>> >>> "Propositions are demonstrable... necessarily or self-evidently >>> the case...referring to logical certainty." >>> >>> How is that different from "axiom?" The only repetitive classical >>> definition of "axiom" I could find was "Propositions that nearly >>> all students will accept without evidence." None from AA though. >> >>I think "axiom" is from Euclid et al. >>Good one here (Etymology, Hitory): >>http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axiom >> >>Apodicticity is what logically certain propositions have: >>they are infallible. Axioms needn't be infallible, >>merely self-evident or generally accepted (e.g. by common >>definition, convention). >>One such is the convention on math that (a x 0 = 0) and (a x 1 >>= a) (?), which, AFAIK, is not proven or anything, and which could >>possibly be otherwise. >>Yet they are axioms. > > I think an "axiom" in math can also be anything one makes up, > so that it is only the consistency of the theory that "proves" > the axiom. However that's properly described, I think it's what > completely removes a math theory from real-world, which I'm told > is great for math. > > So while most debaters still use the classical definition of > "axiom," it seems there is an opportunity for confusion.