fom
Posts:
1,099
Registered:
12/4/12
|
|
Re: The Distinguishability argument of the Reals.
Posted:
Jan 5, 2013 11:21 AM
|
|
On 1/5/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote:
> On 4 Jan., 18:57, fom <fomJ...@nyms.net> wrote:
>> On 1/4/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote:
>
>>>>>> So we are not speaking about the same distinguishability criterion.
>>
>>> There is no other criterion.
>>
>> In logic, discernibility is taken to be with
>> respect to properties.
>
> Can't a number be considered to be a property?
Usually logicians try to keep grammatical properties
separate from "material" properties. Analysis of
the paradoxes led to the use of formalized languages,
in part, to prevent some self-reference attributable
to the ability of natural languages to intermingle
such references. So, I did not consider the property
of the names in my response. On the other hand, it
is in the canonicity of a given system of names that
reflects their use as unique identifiers. But, at
least where Leibniz identity of indiscernibles may
be in play, the non-grammatical properties should
be justifying the grammatical distinctions.
>>
>> Your position seems to be that since the names determine
>> the model which, in turn, determines the truth, then the
>> names are the only criterion.
>
> The model determines the truth if the rules which have to be obeyed by
> the names are taken from observation of reality.
Reality is subjective.
One of the goals of science is a version of truth
that may be considered objective. What if a
completed infinity is a necessary consequence of
the objectivity of science?
|
|
