Virgil
Posts:
4,660
Registered:
1/6/11
|
|
Re: The Distinguishability argument of the Reals.
Posted:
Jan 5, 2013 5:40 PM
|
|
In article <VJudnfwSTauIznXNnZ2dnUVZ_sidnZ2d@giganews.com>,
fom <fomJUNK@nyms.net> wrote:
> On 1/5/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote:
> > On 4 Jan., 18:57, fom <fomJ...@nyms.net> wrote:
> >> On 1/4/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote:
> >
> >>>>>> So we are not speaking about the same distinguishability criterion.
> >>
> >>> There is no other criterion.
> >>
> >> In logic, discernibility is taken to be with
> >> respect to properties.
> >
> > Can't a number be considered to be a property?
>
> Usually logicians try to keep grammatical properties
> separate from "material" properties. Analysis of
> the paradoxes led to the use of formalized languages,
> in part, to prevent some self-reference attributable
> to the ability of natural languages to intermingle
> such references. So, I did not consider the property
> of the names in my response. On the other hand, it
> is in the canonicity of a given system of names that
> reflects their use as unique identifiers. But, at
> least where Leibniz identity of indiscernibles may
> be in play, the non-grammatical properties should
> be justifying the grammatical distinctions.
>
> >>
> >> Your position seems to be that since the names determine
> >> the model which, in turn, determines the truth, then the
> >> names are the only criterion.
> >
> > The model determines the truth if the rules which have to be obeyed by
> > the names are taken from observation of reality.
>
> Reality is subjective.
>
> One of the goals of science is a version of truth
> that may be considered objective. What if a
> completed infinity is a necessary consequence of
> the objectivity of science?
If so, it would totally confirm WM's lack of objectivity!
--
|
|
