In article <VJudnfwSTauIznXNnZ2dnUVZ_sidnZ2d@giganews.com>, fom <fomJUNK@nyms.net> wrote:
> On 1/5/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote: > > On 4 Jan., 18:57, fom <fomJ...@nyms.net> wrote: > >> On 1/4/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote: > > > >>>>>> So we are not speaking about the same distinguishability criterion. > >> > >>> There is no other criterion. > >> > >> In logic, discernibility is taken to be with > >> respect to properties. > > > > Can't a number be considered to be a property? > > Usually logicians try to keep grammatical properties > separate from "material" properties. Analysis of > the paradoxes led to the use of formalized languages, > in part, to prevent some self-reference attributable > to the ability of natural languages to intermingle > such references. So, I did not consider the property > of the names in my response. On the other hand, it > is in the canonicity of a given system of names that > reflects their use as unique identifiers. But, at > least where Leibniz identity of indiscernibles may > be in play, the non-grammatical properties should > be justifying the grammatical distinctions. > > >> > >> Your position seems to be that since the names determine > >> the model which, in turn, determines the truth, then the > >> names are the only criterion. > > > > The model determines the truth if the rules which have to be obeyed by > > the names are taken from observation of reality. > > Reality is subjective. > > One of the goals of science is a version of truth > that may be considered objective. What if a > completed infinity is a necessary consequence of > the objectivity of science?
If so, it would totally confirm WM's lack of objectivity! --