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Virgil
Posts:
6,985
Registered:
1/6/11


Re: Matheology � 199
Posted:
Jan 25, 2013 7:51 PM


In article <8601a2e8e8724a4ab3c57154748f2710@w8g2000yqm.googlegroups.com>, WM <mueckenh@rz.fhaugsburg.de> wrote:
> Matheology § 199 > > Gödel makes a rather strong comparison between "the question of the > objective existence of the objects of mathematical intuition" and the > "question of the objective existence of the outer world" which he > considers to be "an exact replica." > > Gödel's rejection of Russell's "logical fictions" may be seen as a > refusal to regard mathematical objects as "insignificant chimeras of > the brain." > > Gödel's realism, although similar to that of Locke and Leibniz, places > emphasis on the fact that the "axioms force themselves upon us as > being true." This answers a question, untouched by Locke and Leibniz, > why we choose one system, or set of axioms, and not another; that the > choice of a mathematical system is not arbitrary. > > Gödel, in the "Supplement to the Second Edition" of "What is Cantor's > Continuum Problem?" remarked that a physical interpretation could not > decide open questions of set theory, i.e. there was (at the time of > his writing {{and that did never change}}) no "physical set theory" > although there is a physical geometry. > > [Harold Ravitch: "On Gödel's Philosophy of Mathematics"] > http://www.friesian.com/goedel/ > http://www.friesian.com/goedel/chap2.htm
If there is no physical set theory, then physics is irrelevant to set theory and those who are primarily physicists like WM have no business pontificating about it the way WM does.. 



