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Topic: Then answer to Frege's two objections to formalism.
Replies: 17   Last Post: Apr 9, 2013 7:56 AM

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Posts: 2,665
Registered: 6/29/07
Re: Then answer to Frege's two objections to formalism.
Posted: Apr 6, 2013 6:15 AM
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On Apr 6, 8:34 am, Zuhair <zaljo...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 5, 2:25 pm, Zuhair <zaljo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > So:
> > Mathematics is about analytics fictional or real, most interestingly
> > those in proximity with reality.

> > Zuhair
> It is interesting to investigate the say meta-physical basis for this
> virtual-real proximity. The psychological basis are clear, as any
> fiction it wont go viral unless it meets some demands that many people
> share. The pervasiveness of applicability of mathematics can be seen
> to be due to mathematicians limiting their logically driven virtual
> reality to mimic pervasive relations and properties throughout the
> physical universe, as I said for example an investigation of Part-
> whole relation and Connectedness would be of course expected to have
> pervasive applications wide across, since every scientific discipline
> would encounter such relations. Similarly the study of a relation like
> membership and collections would definitely have pervasive
> applications, because those relations are already pervasive. Truly the
> mathematical study of those relations puts them under harsh strict
> rule guidance in a fictional world starting from premises that do
> possess high proximity to what is thought of them to be in the real
> world, the so called "naturalness" of those axioms,  such conditions
> can be argued that the real world need not imitate or follow so
> harshly as regards those relations, but still it is the case that
> studying those pervasive relations cannot really be contemplated
> otherwise, and analytics of those relations under those harsh strict
> virtual grounds had been proved over time to be useful in
> understanding them in the real world! which mean that there is some
> connection between the logically driven fictional world and the real
> world they are approximating. However one to understand that this
> connection might not be identical the fictional world only PROXIMATE
> the reals world, and of course some fictional processing might lead us
> astray from the real world happenings but the error is small to be
> significant from the practical stand point. What are the meta-physics
> of that connection deserves to be studied.
> So interesting mathematics can be understood as: Pervasive analytics
> real or fictional.
> If we redefine virtual to be real or proximal fictional, then
> mathematics in the interesting sense burns down to
> Pervasive virtual analytics.
> So at the end here I've presented the answers to Freges' objections to
> formalism which are the main ones I understand.
> Zuhair

I'll draw two objections to this method.

(1) It is silent on some questions of mathematical interest deeming
them as meta-mathematical.
(2) There are subjects of mathematical interest that are not

The first objection is concerned with questions like is ZFC
consistent? or is ZFC true? etc...
More appropriately put with the context of this method, questions
about justification of the primary rules of the game. Clearly this
method is not concerned with any prior specifications on choice of the
rules of the game, it opens the door wide for ALL such games, and
considers all Analytic output of those games to be mathematical
despite the metaphysical nature of the game or the justification drawn
for its premises, what matters to this method is just the fellowship
of the results from the premises whatever those premises are. But to
many mathematicians the nature of the game is itself important and
justifications around it does matter. The statement that for example:
Con(ZFC) ->Con(Z) although absolutely true analytically yet it would
turn to be a trivial result if ZFC was not consistent, and ignoring
justification for the antecedent in those statements might lead us to
be involved with trivialities.

The answer to this question lies in understanding that not every
question raised within the discourse of some discipline qualifies it
as part of that discipline. For example I need a microscope to
diagnose some infections, now a lens is a part of that microscope but
the detailed manufacture of that lens and questions raised about it is
not part of the clinical medical practice. The details of manufacture
of a drug is not part of internal medicine, yet the internist is
involved primarily in treatment of diseases using drugs. It is the
same matter here mathematics uses rule driven fictional realms to
harvest analytic facts raised within them, the fictional realm itself
and the justification for selecting its rules is not part of
mathematics. What the mathematician demands of course practically
speaking is for the meta-mathematician to tell him that the so and so
system have strong justification, so that he uses them without being
just wasting time with trivialities much like what the physician
demands from the pharmacist or the drug manufacturing company, that
there are evidence that the drug works.

The other objections is that some theories have been of interest to
some mathematicians like ZFC for example, and this being a logically
driven fictional game is too far from being approximative of reality.
It is generally thought that approximating reality would require no
more strength than third order arithmetic which is way weaker than the
vastly strong ZFC, but still ZFC received mathematical interest.

The answer is that ZFC although speaks about a structure that is
vastly huge in comparison to the real world, however still all of its
primitives and premises are to some extent clear and naturally
mimicking albeit leading to strong ideal worlds way beyond the natural
ones. Still the motivation behind such strong theories is that they
can shorten proofs about the fractions of them that are naturally
mimicking, so although some theories in third order arithmetic can be
proved taking say very long proofs by just using third order
arithmetic apparatus, yet using the stronger theory might prove them
in much shorter way! and in that manner they are practical and useful,
so they are worth studying. So those strong systems are hoped to
provide easier and shorter answers to the proximal virtual parts of
them, thus they can be understood as approximating also or more
appropriately put being useful to facilitate such approximations.
However still that objection lies against "interesting mathematics"
and not against the definition given here for "mathematics" in general
which is not needed to be mingled into such matters.

Actually both objections are to be raised against "interesting
mathematics" rather than to the general definition of mathematics
given here, since the later will cover all those cases whether
interesting or not. Of course interesting mathematics have some meta-
mathematical component in directing study of mathematical issues, but
the mathematics harvested at the end are just those that are devoid of
those assumptions, they are just the *fellowship* of results from
those assumptions which has nothing to do with the justification given
to those assumptions per se.


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