I hold that ideally , when we don't know of the necessity of a (that is , not (?a ) holds) , that we should know that it is necessarily so that we don't know of the necessity of a , that is , (? not (?a )) . This makes "classical logic + ?" non-monotonic . It also doesn't prevent anyone from exploring various consequences of either CH or (not CH) . My assumption was it is possible to formulate some questions such that, due some inherent circularity , are rendered unanswerable . Now, this leads to two possible situations : either we know of a statement's truth or falsity, or we know that we can't know of a statement's truth or falsity (as is the case with superdeterminism) . It would be sadistic to assume any other possibility (such as "we can't know , and we can't know that we can't know).