Date: Jan 5, 2013 10:23 PM
Author: fom
Subject: Re: The Distinguishability argument of the Reals.

On 1/5/2013 4:40 PM, Virgil wrote:
> In article <VJudnfwSTauIznXNnZ2dnUVZ_sidnZ2d@giganews.com>,
> fom <fomJUNK@nyms.net> wrote:
>

>> On 1/5/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote:
>>> On 4 Jan., 18:57, fom <fomJ...@nyms.net> wrote:
>>>> On 1/4/2013 5:41 AM, WM wrote:
>>>
>>>>>>>> So we are not speaking about the same distinguishability criterion.
>>>>
>>>>> There is no other criterion.
>>>>
>>>> In logic, discernibility is taken to be with
>>>> respect to properties.

>>>
>>> Can't a number be considered to be a property?

>>
>> Usually logicians try to keep grammatical properties
>> separate from "material" properties. Analysis of
>> the paradoxes led to the use of formalized languages,
>> in part, to prevent some self-reference attributable
>> to the ability of natural languages to intermingle
>> such references. So, I did not consider the property
>> of the names in my response. On the other hand, it
>> is in the canonicity of a given system of names that
>> reflects their use as unique identifiers. But, at
>> least where Leibniz identity of indiscernibles may
>> be in play, the non-grammatical properties should
>> be justifying the grammatical distinctions.
>>

>>>>
>>>> Your position seems to be that since the names determine
>>>> the model which, in turn, determines the truth, then the
>>>> names are the only criterion.

>>>
>>> The model determines the truth if the rules which have to be obeyed by
>>> the names are taken from observation of reality.

>>
>> Reality is subjective.
>>
>> One of the goals of science is a version of truth
>> that may be considered objective. What if a
>> completed infinity is a necessary consequence of
>> the objectivity of science?

>
> If so, it would totally confirm WM's lack of objectivity!
>


Indeed.