On 09/12/2012 09:17 PM, Mr Vjillarton wrote: > OK. What is the mathematical text that defines Descartes 'minds'? Can > you post it?
I forgot what text.
> OK. MW Collegiate Dictionary says the noun, 'location', is defined as: > "1: the act or process of locating". It defines 'ion' as a suffix: "1a : > act or process <validation> b : result of an act or process > <regulation>.
That seems like a verb being called a noun, and I have never heard the word used that way. That must be a poor MW version. OED, the best, says location is '1. a place where something is located.' I meant 'coordinates.' Any native English speaker would know 'location' before 'coordinates.'
> I understand that it would be false for me to try and refute > Chandrakirti's proof. And I do not really mean that anyway. 'Refute' was > a poor word choice. So let me rephrased the question in parts: 1] in > your opinion, does Plato's separation of language and mathematics have > any grounding for serious science? 2] in your opinion, if Plato's > philosophy is true and in actual practice, by scientists, the way i > described it, does it lower Chandrakirti's status as scientific work? If > Chandrakirti's proof is language based, I maintain Plato's philosophy > would do that.
I do not recall Plato's ideas on that, but I think you are wrong. Language can make logical statements. If it is clear what an argument says, then it does not have a 'lower status.'
A problem with other models is that they are based on experimentation and vague definitions, not reason and mathematics. This lowers their status as scientific work. If you ask 100 different scientists what a mind is, you could get 100 different answers, and if you press them to define everything, eventually, going through different areas of science, they may say something like 'I cannot answer that,' or 'I am not sure.'
> "On 09/11/2012 10:15 AM, Mr Vjillarton wrote: 'Existence means > in-the-world. That also means something public. Anyone can represent > their subjectivity in that kind of public so i do not see a conflict > between objectivity and subjectivity. They are both by a correspondence > of modeling, and that is what is either done by language or something > else that is a 'form'.' > > D: "Could you restate that, especially the last sentence?" > ..End Quote. > ------------ > MV responds: > The correspondence of subjectivity is language. The correspondence of > objectivity is 'form'. Subjectivity before it is represented to others > in language is not originally public. Objectivity before it is > represented in any 'form' is originally public. There are two > models--language and form. Language can also represent objects. But that > is not serious science, based on Plato's philosophy and historiography.
Further above, you used 'public' wrong, and as far as I know it has no application to linguistics, and you did not say how subjectivity and objectivity are 'by,' or what all this 'correspondence' is about. You said there are two models, but not in what context, but there are many others. Whatever you are trying to say is unclear to me, and I do not even recall the original context of what I asked you to restate, or if it was related to my original post or something related to it.
> Then we just have to agree to disagree on this. Here is the reference > _R_596.e [Bloom] :
If you were agreeing, you would not have continued.
> "..if you are willing to take a mirror and carry it around everywhere, > quickly you will make the sun.. the things in heaven.. earth.. > yourself.. animals.. implements.. plants.. everything else that was just > now mentioned." > > Jowett and Waterfield have the term 'mirror' too. But Jowett does not > have the word 'carry'. Waterfield does. So, 'carry' a technological > mirror is what is missing from Jowett. > > I was taught Plato was an 'idealist' and given the Jowett text for > class. Years later, when I had time, and read more philosophers who said > the Platonic 'forms' are in-the-world, I questioned this since that is > not strict idealism. I had to decide for myself. By chance, I found > Robin Waterfield's version of the _R_ and the strange title for BK 10: > "Poetry and Unreality". Thereafter, I compared many versions of the > 596.e passage, and found Bloom's one of the best. Wiki calls Plato's > philosophy Platonic Realism. I think that is more appropriate now.
I see nothing to do with idealism or realism in that passage. Without the beginning and rest of the sentence, I am also going to say it just sounds like figurative language.
> I would be interested to know about Taylor's translation? Can you post > it?