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Topic: Matheology § 300
Replies: 27   Last Post: Jul 12, 2013 6:58 PM

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Posts: 4,165
From: London
Registered: 2/8/08
Re: Matheology § 300
Posted: Jul 12, 2013 5:33 AM
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"fom" <> wrote in message
> On 7/11/2013 12:39 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote:
>> "fom" <> wrote in message

>>> On 7/8/2013 4:45 PM, wrote:
>>>> On Monday, 8 July 2013 23:24:10 UTC+2, FredJeffries wrote:
>>>>> On Monday, July 8, 2013 10:39:01 AM UTC-7,
>>>>> wrote: > > Hahaha. And if enumerated, you think you can be sure to
>>>>> get even the last one out???

>>>>> Explain it slowly:
>>>> If "all" could leave the urn, one must have left without another
>>>> remaining there. Or go many together?
>>>> Explain it slowly: In scientific applications of "all" there is
>>>> always and "end signal", a last one.

>>> Except when WM is asked for that number which is the last number.

>> WM would not agree there is a last one, mind the confusion. Indeed, I
>> think he is quite correct here: he is saying "to have *all*" we need an
>> "end-signal", which looks perfectly sensible, IMO.

> Aristotle actually considers this.
> For Aristotle, the generality of a universal statement
> takes priority over an exhaustive specification of a
> domain.
> He distinguishes between "prior by nature" and "prior
> to us". Associated with "prior to us" is our own
> perception. Thus it corresponds with certain philosophical
> views we associate with empiricism.
> Aristotle's preference with respect to "prior by nature"
> has to do with the interpretation of a universal quantifier
> in relation to arbitrary choice. This arbitrariness
> follows from the intention of what is stated in a
> deduction. The truth of a consequence ought not to
> be dependent on the inductive specification of a domain.
> Aristotle views this as being prior in two different
> ways, and, therefore, circular.
> That is just his opinion, of course.

And WM's: naturalists, ultra-finitists. Of course, Aristotle is justified,
WM isn't...


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