Gödel's Theorem and Information
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|Gregory J. Chaitin|
|Gödel's theorem may be demonstrated using arguments having an information-theoretic flavor arguing that if a theorem contains more information than a given set of axioms, then it is impossible for the theorem to be derived from the axioms. In contrast with the traditional proof based on the paradox of the liar, this new viewpoint suggests that the incompleteness phenomenon discovered by Gödel is natural and widespread rather than pathological and unusual. Published in the International Journal of Theoretical Physics 22 (1982), pp. 941-954.|
|Math Topics:||Logic/Foundations, Philosophy|
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