On 7/7/2013 5:02 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: > "fom" <fomJUNK@nyms.net> wrote in message > news:_9idnQkXucdXIETMnZ2dnUVZ_gqdnZ2d@giganews.com... >> On 7/7/2013 1:10 PM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>> "fom" <fomJUNK@nyms.net> wrote in message >>> news:6LSdnVj9KObNO0TMnZ2dnUVZ_sadnZ2d@giganews.com... >>>> On 7/7/2013 8:06 AM, Julio Di Egidio wrote: >>>>> "Julio Di Egidio" <email@example.com> wrote in message >>>>> news:firstname.lastname@example.org... >>>>> >>>>>> We know it when you know it, it self-represents >>>>> >>>>> Oops, I just meant: We know it when we know it... >>>> >>>> It is common among the men with whom I >>>> work to hear, "It is what it is". >>>> >>>> I take it to be an article of faith >>> >>> Is that all you could gather? Then I'll give you another pearl to think >>> about: dogmatism and scepticism are the two sides of the same coin. But >>> take your time... >> >> Well, I had been thinking in terms of the >> fact that experience has an unavoidable >> subjective sense. It invariably admits the >> reduction of linguistic expressions to mere >> syntax. But, it is also the subjective >> experience that affords meaningful interpretation. > > I do not see how linguistic expression (language) can be reduced to > syntax: a sign is not a symbol, the magic is all in the interpreter. >
Two different individuals with two different subjective experiences may interpret linguistic expressions differently.
In like fashion, there is the Fregean argument that any mark can signify.
There are a great many aspects to pragmatics involved with meaning. Carnap is attributed with delineating syntax, semantics, and pragmatics.
Agreements as to the fact that an expression is well-formed and that particular well-formed expressions have particular meanings are matters which fall into the domain of pragmatics.
I have traced the unmentioned role of pragmatics with respect to the notion of "undefined language primitives". Bolzano and Frege both speak of conveying meaning through explanation and example. This is pragmatics. The argument actually defeats the idea that meaning is given through truth valuation.
Both, however, had been seeking the notion of substantive reference as the arbiter of meaning in the sense of metaphysical truth. So, this is different from mere truth valuation.
Only the quote I provided from De Morgan suggests a mechanism where an individual's subjective experience is the sole determiner of meaning.
>> It is in the transition from subjective to >> objective where all of the difficulties seem to >> arise. > > We have already spoken about these seeming difficulties: what > "objectivity" I would ask? I.e. same cart before the horses.
Then I must assume you choose to be a Humean skeptic.
You wish to deny skepticism. Now I am not convinced. Kant made a heroic attempt at rejecting Hume while reconciling Newtonian empiricism with Leibnizian idealism. These are his stated objectives in his writings. If you wish me to argue these points, direct me to the philosopher (relevant to the foundations of mathematics) who addresses Hume.
This will provide me with a common background to discuss this matter. I believe, however, you will find none.
If you really wish me to discuss the question "what objectivity?" on my terms, then let us discuss "Critique of Pure Reason" and "Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics". Kant specifically introduces the distinction between intuition and understanding to provide a context for delineating the subjective from the objective.
> There > just is no such thing as a purely syntactical proof. >
Perhaps. But logic concerns itself with the linguistic forms used in argumentation. Part of its science is to classify and categorize the schema which it discerns from its analyses.