
Re: [OT] randomness doesn't meet criteria of theory
Posted:
Aug 17, 2013 7:52 AM


In article <pi3u09pgvts8igcnp8cnqbkkla959cgbr5@4ax.com>, bob@1776.COM says... > > On Tue, 06 Aug 2013 22:14:40 0400, Dale <invalid@invalid.invalid> wrote: > : to prove randomness you would have to recreate all of creation > : throughout time and do a MANOVA on ALL variables including time, I now > : add outside of the timeframe somehow, as far as I know you can't escape > : timeframe without removing or adding variables, so the experiment is > : not possible and randomness is not testable and therefore only an > : hypothesis not a theory > : > : the same applies to claims of random genetic mutations, random > : radioactive decay, random zero point energy, etc. > > It's convenient to have a theory whose propositions are testable, but the real > world isn't guaranteed to work that way. Some problems are provably > unsolvable. > > Many of the accepted principles of physics rely on proofs that ultimately > depend on the law of the excluded middle (i.e., the idea that every assertion > is either true or false).
Huh? Physics does not depend on "proofs", it depends on evidence. Mathematics depends on proofs but mathematics is an intellectual recreation that is occasionally useful, it is not in itself a science.
> But the law of the excluded middle is itself false. > ("This statement is false" is a conspicuous counterexample.) Physicists > rationalize that the circumstances in which the law doesn't hold are well > understood and physically unimportant, but just try to get them to prove that.
No, physicists when they find that the law doesn't hold, want to know why and under what circumstances and when the figure that out then they modify "the law" accordingly.
Can you give us some examples of "the law not holding" that are regarded as "well understood and physically unimportant" that don't involve your own misunderstanding of simplified models used for computational convenience?

